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SUBJECT:POLADS DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE

REF: USNATO 5299

MISSION MAY DRAW UPON FOLLOWING INR REPORT ON CURRENT
RELATIONS BETWEEN SOVIET AND EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES
FOR POLADS DISCUSSION.

1. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CLEARLY SHOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE
ADOPTED A MORE MILITANT POSTURE TOWARDWEST EUROPEAN
COMMUNIST PARTIES. THIS INCREASED MILITANCY:

(A)--SUGGESTS THAT MOSCOW IS HEADED TOWARD CONFRONTATION
WITH KEY WEST EUROPEAN CP'S OVER REVOLUTIONARY TACTICS IN
A PERIOD OF "POPULAR FRONTS";

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(B)--FURTHER DECREASES THE PROSPECTS FOR AN EARLY CONVEN-
ING OF THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES, AT
LEAST BEFORE THE 25TH CPSU PARTY CONGRESS; AND

(C)--RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET PERCEPTION AND PURSUIT OF DETENTE POLICIES ALONG PRESENT LINES.

2. THE INCREASED SOVIET MILITANCY STEMS FROM A NUMBER OF FACTORS, AMONG WHICH THE MOST IMPORTANT APPEARS TO BE RISING SOVIET CONCERN OVER THE EROSION OF IDEOLOGICAL AND

ORGANIZATIONAL DISCIPLINE IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT; THIS EROSION, IN TURN, STEMS PARTLY FROM THE PROTRACTED SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, AND PARTLY FROM THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE EASING OF TENSION AND THE CONTINUED NEED FOR UNITY.

3. EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE: THERE IS NOW MOUNTING EVIDENCE THAT MOSCOW SEEMS RESIGNED NOT TO HAVE THE ALL-EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE CONVENE BEFORE NEXT YEAR'S 25TH SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS. REPORTS FROM SEVERAL EAST EUROPEAN CAPITALS INDICATE THAT EVEN SOME SOVIET OFFICIALS PRIVATELY ARE NOW DOWNPLAYING THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EARLY MEETING AND ARE ALSO SEEKING TO DISSOCIATE BREZHNEV FROM THE WHOLE AFFAIR. THIS APPARENT DOWNGRADING OF THE MEETING IS CONSONANT WITH THE VIRTUAL NEWS BLACKOUT ON CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS BOTH IN SOVIET MEDIA AND IN THE MEDIA OF EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES THAT HAVE SUPPORTED THE SOVIET POSITIONS.

4. PREPARATIONS FOR THE ALL-EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE DID NOT GET OFF TO A GOOD START AT THE WARSAW CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES (OCTOBER 16-18, 1974). WHILE ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA PUT IN AN APPEARANCE--BOTH HAD BEEN ABSENT FROM THE KARLOVY VARY MEETING IN 1967--THE PROCEEDINGS REVEALED SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES AMONG THE PARTICIPANTS. THESE DIFFERENCES LED TO THE ADOPTION OF A RATHER ANODYNE COMMUNIQUE AND SUGGESTED THAT THE ROAD TO THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE DIFFICULT.

(A)--THE SOVIETS HAD TO ACCEPT ANOTHER PREPARATORY MEETING--
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ING FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE AGENDA AND PROCEDURE.

(B)--BOTH THE ROMANIANS AND THE YUGOSLAVS HEDGED THEIR ATTENDANCE AT FUTURE MEETINGS WITH ALL KINDS OF QUALIFICATIONS, PRESUMABLY REACTING TO DEFT SOVIET HINTS ABOUT "STRENGTHENING BY ALL POSSIBLE MEANS THE UNITY AND COHESION OF THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT."

(C)--THE HUNGARIANS PLAYED THE ROLE OF DOG IN THE MANGER WITH THEIR COMMENT THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSENSUS MUST NOT HAMPER "THE JOINT ACTION OF THE DECISIVE MAJORITY."

5. DIFFERENCES WERE NOT RESOLVED AT THE BUDAPEST MEETING

(DECEMBER 19-21, 1974), WHERE PONOMAREV MADE A STRONG DEFENSE OF SOVIET DETENTE POLICIES; HE OBVIOUSLY WAS RESPONDING TO RECURRENT COMMUNIST CRITICISM FROM SOME WEST EUROPEAN PARTIES--POSSIBLY ALSO FROM WITHIN THE CPSU--ON THE THRUST OF SOVIET DETENTE PRIORITIES. AT ISSUE WAS NOT DETENTE ITSELF BUT THE SOVIET INSISTENCE OF LINKING IT TO "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM," WHICH THE WEST EUROPEAN PARTIES TENDED TO REJECT IN THEIR RESISTANCE TO SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL DOMINATION AND THEIR DECREASING READINESS TO SUBORDINATE THEIR INTERESTS TO THOSE OF MOSCOW.

6. ON THE ALWAYS SENSITIVE ISSUE OF CHINA, PONOMAREV TOOK REFUGE IN CIRCUMLOCUTION. NEVERTHELESS, HIS ATTACKS ON "ANTI-SOVIETISM" AND HIS DEMAND THAT A FUTURE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE SHOULD NAME THE ENEMIES OF DETENTE COULD ONLY FEED THE SUSPICION OF HIS WARY AUDIENCE ABOUT MOSCOW'S INTENTION OF HAVING CHINA PILLORIED AT THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE.

7. SINCE THE BUDAPEST MEETING, PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE HAVE SLOWED DOWN PERCEPTIBLY. ALTHOUGH EAST BERLIN WAS PICKED AS THE LOCATION FOR THE ULTIMATE CONFERENCE, REPEATED MEETINGS OF WORKING GROUPS OF THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE HAVE MADE NO PROGRESS WITH THE DRAFT DOCUMENT. AT A MEETING LAST FEBRUARY, THE HOSTING EAST GERMANS WERE INSTRUCTED TO PREPARE A PRELIMINARY DRAFT. IT WAS REJECTED AS UNACCEPTABLE BY THE ROMANIANS AND YUGOSLAVS, SUPPORTED IN VARYING DEGREES BY THE ITALIAN, BRITISH, SECRET

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SWEDISH, AND SPANISH.

8. DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY: THE ISSUE WHICH PITTED THESE PARTIES AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS REVOLVED AROUND THE FACT THAT

(A)--THE YUGOSLAVS, THE ROMANIANS, AND THEIR SUPPORTERS AMONG NONRULING PARTIES FELT THAT THE CONFERENCE DOCUMENT SHOULD DEAL ONLY WITH POLITICAL UNITY OF ACTION BECAUSE ANY IDEOLOGICAL STATEMENT WOULD BE CONSTRUED AS AN ATTEMPT TO REASSERT SOVIET AUTHORITY AND ORTHODOXY;

(B)--THE SOVIETS WERE CONSTANTLY ENGAGED IN ILL-DISGUISED ATTEMPTS TO PUSH FOR IDEOLOGICAL AS WELL AS ACTION UNITY, IN SHORT, TO REVERT TO THE DISCREDITED PRECEPTS OF "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM" REMINISCENT OF THE COMINFORM.

9. THIS BASIC QUARREL PUNCTUATED THE SEVERAL MEETINGS OF THE SUBGROUP OF EIGHT PARTIES, DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN SUPPORTERS (CPSU, EAST GERMAN, FRENCH, AND DANISH PARTIES) AND OPPONENTS (YUGOSLAV, ROMANIAN, ITALIAN, AND SPANISH PARTIES) OF A MORE HARDLINE IDEOLOGICALLY

ORIENTED POSITION. THE SUBGROUP MET REPEATEDLY IN APRIL, MAY, JUNE, AND JULY, AND ANOTHER MEETING REPORTEDLY IS SCHEDULED FOR THIS MONTH. (NOFORN, USIBONLY/NOCONTRACT)

10. AS THE DEADLOCK OVER THE DRAFT DOCUMENT DEEPENED, ATTEMPTS WERE MADE IN VARIOUS BILATERAL ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN THE SOVIETS, THE ITALIANS, THE YUGOSLAVS, THE FRENCH, AND THE ROMANIANS TO BREAK THE STALEMATE, BUT THEY WERE INCONCLUSIVE.

(A)--YUGOSLAV SOURCES GENERALLY DESCRIBE THE SOVIETS AS BEING INTRACTABLE AND HOLD OUT LITTLE HOPE FOR ANY GIVE IN MOSCOW'S POSITION. (NOFORN, USIBONLY, NOCONTRACT)

(B)--ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ROMANIANS, PRESUMABLY HOPING TO AVOID A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH MOSCOW, AT TIMES HAVE FELT THAT THE SOVIETS MUST COME AROUND EVENTUALLY SINCE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD COMMITTED ITSELF TO HAVE A MEETING. (NOFORN, USIBONLY/NOCONTRACT)

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(C)--CONVERSELY, ITALIAN INFORMANTS REPEATEDLY HAVE SINGLED OUT THE HARDLINE FRENCH AS THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS IN DRAFTING THE FINAL DOCUMENT.

11. DETENTE AND IDEOLOGICAL MILITANCY: IN THE DEBATE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND KEY WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, A RECURRENT ISSUE HAS BEEN THE EXTENT TO WHICH DETENTE HAS INTERFERED WITH MOSCOW'S EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN ITS IDEOLOGICAL SUPREMACY AND ITS REVOLUTIONARY LEGITIMACY WITH OTHER PARTIES. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP PLACES MUCH OF THE BLAME FOR ITS DIFFICULTIES ON THIS SCORE ON THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, IT IS ALSO AWARE OF THE DIFFERENCES THAT HAVE GROWN BETWEEN MOSCOW'S PERCEPTION OF HOW TO PURSUE DETENTE AND THAT OF KEY WEST EUROPEAN CP'S.

12. ON THE ONE HAND, THE SOVIETS HAVE FOUND IT NECESSARY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST CHINESE CHARGES THAT DETENTE IS BUT ANOTHER FORM OF US-SOVIET COLLUSION DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM SEEKING TO TRANSFORM THEIR OWN SOCIETIES IN WAYS CONSONANT WITH THEIR DOMESTIC REQUIREMENTS. THIS CHINESE ACCUSATION FELL ON RECEPTIVE EARS; IN THE CASE OF THE SPANISH CP, IT LED TO A PROLONGED DEBATE BETWEEN THAT PARTY'S LEADERSHIP AND THE SOVIETS ON WHICH A COMPROMISE WAS NOT REACHED UNTIL JUST BEFORE THE WARSAW PREPARATORY MEETING OF OCTOBER 1974.

13. ON THE OTHER HAND, MOSCOW DISCOVERED HOW THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN QUESTION INCREASINGLY SOUGHT TO ADAPT DETENTE TO REINFORCE THEIR OWN DOMESTIC STRATEGIES IN WAYS WHICH TOOK LESS AND LESS ACCOUNT OF BROADER SOVIET

OBJECTIVES ON EAST-WEST ISSUES. THUS, SOVIET PRACTICES
CAUSED DIFFICULTIES WITH VARIOUS PARTIES WHEN IT APPEARED

THAT MOSCOW PURSUED EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES IN DEFIANCE OF
THE INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED:

(A)--IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN FRANCE IN 1974,
MOSCOW APPARENTLY FAVORED GISCARD D'ESTAING AFTER HAVING
COLD-SHOULDERED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JOINT COMMUNIST-
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SOCIALIST PROGRAM. THIS ACT LED THE FRENCH CP TO CRITI-
CIZE MOSCOW OPENLY FOR UNDERMINING ITS POLITICAL
PROSPECTS.

(B)--THE SPANISH CP LEADERSHIP WAS OUTRAGED WHEN A NUMBER
OF EAST EUROPEAN STATES ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
WITH FRANCO, CLEARLY WITH SOVIET ACQUIESCENCE.

(C)--THE ITALIAN CP WAS CRITICIZED BY MOSCOW FOR ITS
OVERLY AGGRESSIVE POSTURE ON THE DIVORCE REFERENDUM IN
1974. MORE RECENTLY, MOSCOW REPORTEDLY HAS BEEN FURIOUS
WITH THE PARTY'S CRITICISM OF THE PORTUGUESE CP AND HAS
ALSO TAKEN THE FORMER TO TASK FOR GOING TOO FAR IN ITS
COLLABORATION WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS. (NOFORN,
USIBONLY/NOCONTRACT)

14. THESE DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF DETENTE AND REVO-
LUTIONARY MILITANCY HAVE SHARPENED CONSIDERABLY, FIRST, IN
THE WAKE OF THE STALLED PREPARATIONS FOR THE ALL-EUROPEAN
PARTY CONFERENCE, AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY, AS THE RESULT OF
THE DEBATE OVER THE RECENT PRAVDA ARTICLE BY K. ZARODOV,
TRANSPARENTLY ATTACKING THE REVISIONIST POLICIES OF THE
FRENCH, ITALIAN, AND SPANISH PARTIES.

15. SOVIET CALCULATIONS: UNTIL RECENTLY, THE SOVIETS
SEEM TO HAVE BEEN PLAYING A WAITING GAME. THEIR ASSUMP-
TION THAT THEY COULD SANDWICH IN THE ALL-EUROPEAN CONFER-
ENCE AS ONE OF A SERIES OF SUCCESSFUL DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN
POLICY VENTURES THAT THEY COULD PRESENT AT THE FORTHCOMING
PARTY CONGRESS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN BADLY MISTAKEN. IN
ADDITION, MOSCOW SEEMS TO HAVE BECOME SOMEWHAT DISILLUSION-
ED WITH THE POPULAR UNITY PURSUED BY KEY WEST EUROPEAN
PARTIES AS THAT SEEMS TO HAVE ACCELERATED THEIR DEPARTURE
FROM WHAT, IN THE SOVIET VIEW, ARE THE INVIOLEATE CANONS
OF MARXISM-LENINISM. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, IT IS AN
OPEN QUESTION WHETHER THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS NOT MORE
CONCERNED NOW WITH THE REESTABLISHMENT OF GREATER IDEO-
LOGICAL DISCIPLINE AMONG THE PARTIES THAN WITH THE EARLY
CONVENING OF THE PAN-EUROPEAN MEETING.

16. ALTHOUGH MOSCOW HAS NOT REVOKED ITS ENDORSEMENT OF
POPULAR UNITY, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BREZHNEV'S PUBLIC

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PRAISE OF ZARODOV FOR HIS WORK AS EDITOR-IN-CHIEF OF THE WORLD MARXIST REVIEW, WILL NOT BE LOST ON THE WEST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES. ZARODOV IS THE AUTHOR OF THE MUCH-DISCUSSED ARTICLE IN PRAVDA, WHICH CALLED UPON FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES TO BE LESS ACCOMMODATING IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THEIR POPULAR FRONT PARTNERS, IN CONSONANCE WITH LENIN'S INJUNCTION THAT COMMUNIST PARTIES CAN NEVER ABANDON THEIR ROLE AS REVOLUTIONARY VANGUARD. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ARTICLE NOT ONLY OPPOSED THE POLICY OF THE FRENCH, ITALIAN, SPANISH, AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN PARTIES OF ADHERING TO DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR BUT ALSO SEEMED TO ENDORSE THE POSITION OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY, WHICH THEY HAD HEAVILY CRITICIZED.

17. THE FACT THAT ZARODOV'S PIECE WAS ROUNDLY CONDEMNED BY FRENCH, ITALIAN, BRITISH, AND YUGOSLAV COMMUNIST COMMENTATORS NOW SEEMS TO PUT THESE PARTIES AND THE SOVIETS ON A COLLISION COURSE. HOW FAR THE ALTERCATION WILL BE PUSHED IS STILL UNCLEAR, BUT MOSCOW TRADITIONALLY HAS REACTED WITH LITTLE REGARD FOR OTHER PARTIES' CONCERNS WHENEVER IT HAS FELT ITSELF CHALLENGED AS THE FOUNTAIN-HEAD OF IDEOLOGICAL PREEMINENCE AND REVOLUTIONARY LEGITIMACY. BESIDES, SOVIET LEADERS PROBABLY ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEIR HARDLINE POSTURE, THEIR APPEALS TO UNITY, AND THE INEVITABLE DIVISIONS AMONG THOSE OPPOSING THEIR POSITION EVENTUALLY WILL CONTINUE TO PRODUCE THE DESIRED EFFECT. HENCE, IT WOULD NOT BE SUPRISING TO SEE MOSCOW REMAIN ADAMANT WITH RESPECT TO THESE ASPECTS OF THE DRAFT DOCUMENT THAT HAVE GIVEN RISE TO PROLONGED DISPUTES AND DELAYS.

18. CONVERSELY, THE TIME HAS LONG PASSED WHEN MOSCOW COULD STILL DICTATE TO OTHER PARTIES THE POLICY POSITIONS THAT IT WANTS TO SEE ADOPTED. HENCE, THE SOVIETS MUST BE PREPARED TO SUFFER DAMAGE TO THEIR PRESTIGE SHOULD KEY PARTIES ABSENT THEMSELVES FROM THE CONFERENCE ALTOGETHER OR DISSENT FROM THE DOCUMENTS ISSUED THERE. THIS SITUATION AROSE AT THE 1969 WORLD CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES, AND IT SEEMS LIKELY TO DO SO AGAIN.

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19. FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THOSE ASPECTS OF DETENTE THAT HELP TO ERODE THE IDEOLOGICAL UNITY AND COHESION OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT ARE NOT WORTH CULTIVATING. THE PROBLEM IS HOW TO REVERSE THE INCREASINGLY ACCOMMODATIONIST ATTITUDE OF WEST EUROPEAN

COMMUNIST PARTIES WITHOUT DESTROYING THOSE ASPECTS OF
DETENTE (SALT, BUT NOT CERTAIN BASKET-III-TYPE ISSUES)
THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STILL REGARDS AS WORTHWHILE.

20. WHAT THIS REQUIRES IS INSULATING THE VARIOUS WEST
EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES FROM THE CORROSIVE EFFECTS OF
AN EVOLUTION WHICH THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES HAVE ADVERTISED
AS A NEW DAWN FOR THE PARTIES CONCERNED. IT IS THE RESO-
LUTION OF THIS QUESTION WHICH CURRENTLY OCCUPIES THE
KREMLIN AS IT SEEKS TO INVOKE OLD SHIBBOLETHS AND TRADI-
TIONAL FORMS OF IDEOLOGICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL COHESION
TO RETAIN A PREEMINENT ROLE FOR ITSELF. WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED. KISSINGER

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